Giulio Douchet was an artillery commander and General in the Italian Army back in the 1920s, before that he'd started keeping a diary and thoughts on what he'd learned in the military.
In 1909 and 1910 he published his book on war strategy, re-wrote parts of it, and a new version was put forth in 1929.
He is often considered one of the originators of the theory on air-superiority.
I'd like to discuss some of his theories, and put things into the proper context here.
Okay so, in response to Michael D.
Pixley on his assessment of Giulio Douhet's "Command of the Air" - based on Pixley's article appearing on July 14, 2005 in Air and Space Journal titled: "False Gospel for Airpower Strategy? A Fresh Look at Giulio Douhet's 'Command of the Air'.
" - I must say that I agree with the comments of Michael D.
Pixley especially with keeping Douhet in context, while reading "Command of the Air" - as I read, I too kept considering the reality of his environment on the time of his writing.
Indeed, I too think it is unwise to project his works into the 21st century of aerial warfare, but, we should read his work while thinking of all time-periods.
Therefore, Pixley may actually have missed some value in Douhet's work.
I'd say Pixley, needs to take an additional step back from his own mirror to see his broader life-experience as he comments as well, as I will too, as I make the following comments; First, I wholeheartedly agree with Pixley's assessment and his comments on Douhet, and how Douhet's ideas were borrowed and used at RAND to advise the "Strategic Air Command" during the cold war.
Even the name; "The Strategic Air Command" suggests the influence from Douchet's work.
All in all, Douchet's work is interesting, as he makes some very valid points, shares with us history, as he saw it from his point of view, and we can use his observations in strategizing, but we must be aware that Douhet, as he speaks to a component of aerial assets in the battlefield had made significant errors with regards to the use of "close air-support" and precision strikes.
You see, even a bird can crap on a red car that bothers it, while flying by, and I know this from the car wash business.
Thus, I wonder why Douhet, being so observant didn't pick any of that up? Leonardo da Vinci with a similar background in thinking process would have, 100s of years the prior.
Now then, Pixley comments on Douhet's morality and fascist thought process, along with his hard-hitting comments on Douhet over all, seem to miss Douhet's point in dismissing the humanity issue for a purely analytical approach to winning in a war, based on the "total war" scenario.
Indeed, it is my belief that Douhet was unfortunately probably tormented by the brutality of war, and thus, withdrawn and turned introspective, perhaps to help him explain the carnage he'd witnessed, to rationalize it, and probably to keep from going insane I suppose - just guessing from Douhet's writings.
Finally, I believe Pixley to have made a fair assessment of Douchet in the final paragraph of his brilliant essay, thus, allowing the reader peace of mind when studying Douhet's observations, as long as it is within the proper context, time period, region, and scope of the day.
Please consider all this and think on it.