Beliefs & Choices: Are Beliefs Like Actions?
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We have seen that there are analogies in language for belief being both voluntary and involuntary, but on the whole the analogies for voluntarism aren't very strong. A more significant problem for the voluntarism held by most Christians is that an examination of the nature of holding beliefs does not lead to the conclusion that they are very much like actions, which are voluntary.
For example, everyone realizes that even after a person has concluded beyond any doubt what they must do, that doesn't mean that they will automatically do it.
This is because well beyond their conclusion is the fact that extra steps must be taken to actually make the action happen. If you decide that you must grab a child to save it from an unseen danger, the actions don't happen all by themselves; instead, your mind must initiate further steps to take the best course of action.
There does not appear to be any parallel when it comes to beliefs. Once a person realizes what they must believe beyond all doubt, what other steps do they take in order to have that belief? None, it seems ? there is nothing left to do. Thus, there is no extra, identifiable step which we can label the act of "choosing." If you realize that a child is about to fall into water which they don't see, no extra steps are needed to believe that the child is in danger. You don't "choose" to believe this, it simply because your belief due to the force of the facts in front of you.
The act of concluding something isn't a choice of a belief ? here, the term is being used in the sense of a logical result a reasoning process, not simply a "decision." For example, when you conclude or realize that a table is in the room, you aren't "choosing" to believe that there is a table in the room.
Assuming that you, like most people, value the information provided by your senses, your conclusion is a logical result of what you know. After that, you make no extra, identifiable steps to "choose" to believe that there is a table there.
But this does not mean that actions and beliefs are not closely related. Indeed, beliefs are usually the products of various actions. Some of those actions might include reading books, watching television, and talking to people. They would also include how much weight you give to the information provided by your senses. This is similar to how a broken leg may not be an action, but it certainly might be a product of an action, like skiing.
What this means, then, is that we are indirectly responsible for the beliefs we do and do not hold because we are directly responsible for the actions we take which do or do not lead to beliefs. Thus, although the Queen may be wrong in suggesting that we can believe something just by trying, we may be able to achieve a belief in something by doing things like educating ourselves or, perhaps, even deluding ourselves. It would be wrong to hold us responsible for not trying hard enough to "choose" to believe, but it may be appropriate to hold us responsible for not trying hard enough to learn enough to arrive at reasonable beliefs.
For example, one can be praised for not having any beliefs about a neighbor's sex life because such a belief can only be acquired by poking about in someone else's business. On the other hand, one can be blamed for not having a belief about who should win the next presidential election because this means not having paid any attention to the recent news about the candidates and the issues.
One can be praised for acquiring beliefs through having gone to the trouble of studying, researching, and making a genuine attempt to gather as much information as possible. By the same token, one can be blamed for acquiring beliefs through deliberately ignoring evidence, arguments, and ideas which might tend to create doubt about long-held assumptions.
Thus, while we may not be able to have rules about what we should believe, we can create ethical principles about how we acquire and affect our beliefs. Some processes can be considered less ethical, others more ethical.
Understanding that our responsibility for our beliefs is only indirect has some consequences for Christian doctrines, too. A Christian might criticize a person for not making an effort to learn more about Christianity, even to the point of arguing that such lapses could be enough to send a person to hell. However, there can be no rational argument that a just God would send a person to hell if they had investigated and simply failed to find sufficient reason to believe.
This is not to suggest that following ethical principles for acquiring beliefs will automatically lead a person to Truth, or even that Truth is what we necessarily need to work towards all the time. Sometimes, we may value a comforting lie over a harsh truth ? for example, by allowing a fatally wounded person to believe that they will be fine.
But, oddly enough, the fact is that while we may be willing to allow others to believe a lie for their peace of mind, it is rare to find anyone who does not doggedly believe that they must always believe things that are truthful. Indeed, many of us would consider it blameworthy if we pursued anything else ? an apparent set of double standards.
We have seen that there are analogies in language for belief being both voluntary and involuntary, but on the whole the analogies for voluntarism aren't very strong. A more significant problem for the voluntarism held by most Christians is that an examination of the nature of holding beliefs does not lead to the conclusion that they are very much like actions, which are voluntary.
For example, everyone realizes that even after a person has concluded beyond any doubt what they must do, that doesn't mean that they will automatically do it.
This is because well beyond their conclusion is the fact that extra steps must be taken to actually make the action happen. If you decide that you must grab a child to save it from an unseen danger, the actions don't happen all by themselves; instead, your mind must initiate further steps to take the best course of action.
There does not appear to be any parallel when it comes to beliefs. Once a person realizes what they must believe beyond all doubt, what other steps do they take in order to have that belief? None, it seems ? there is nothing left to do. Thus, there is no extra, identifiable step which we can label the act of "choosing." If you realize that a child is about to fall into water which they don't see, no extra steps are needed to believe that the child is in danger. You don't "choose" to believe this, it simply because your belief due to the force of the facts in front of you.
The act of concluding something isn't a choice of a belief ? here, the term is being used in the sense of a logical result a reasoning process, not simply a "decision." For example, when you conclude or realize that a table is in the room, you aren't "choosing" to believe that there is a table in the room.
Assuming that you, like most people, value the information provided by your senses, your conclusion is a logical result of what you know. After that, you make no extra, identifiable steps to "choose" to believe that there is a table there.
But this does not mean that actions and beliefs are not closely related. Indeed, beliefs are usually the products of various actions. Some of those actions might include reading books, watching television, and talking to people. They would also include how much weight you give to the information provided by your senses. This is similar to how a broken leg may not be an action, but it certainly might be a product of an action, like skiing.
What this means, then, is that we are indirectly responsible for the beliefs we do and do not hold because we are directly responsible for the actions we take which do or do not lead to beliefs. Thus, although the Queen may be wrong in suggesting that we can believe something just by trying, we may be able to achieve a belief in something by doing things like educating ourselves or, perhaps, even deluding ourselves. It would be wrong to hold us responsible for not trying hard enough to "choose" to believe, but it may be appropriate to hold us responsible for not trying hard enough to learn enough to arrive at reasonable beliefs.
For example, one can be praised for not having any beliefs about a neighbor's sex life because such a belief can only be acquired by poking about in someone else's business. On the other hand, one can be blamed for not having a belief about who should win the next presidential election because this means not having paid any attention to the recent news about the candidates and the issues.
One can be praised for acquiring beliefs through having gone to the trouble of studying, researching, and making a genuine attempt to gather as much information as possible. By the same token, one can be blamed for acquiring beliefs through deliberately ignoring evidence, arguments, and ideas which might tend to create doubt about long-held assumptions.
Thus, while we may not be able to have rules about what we should believe, we can create ethical principles about how we acquire and affect our beliefs. Some processes can be considered less ethical, others more ethical.
Understanding that our responsibility for our beliefs is only indirect has some consequences for Christian doctrines, too. A Christian might criticize a person for not making an effort to learn more about Christianity, even to the point of arguing that such lapses could be enough to send a person to hell. However, there can be no rational argument that a just God would send a person to hell if they had investigated and simply failed to find sufficient reason to believe.
This is not to suggest that following ethical principles for acquiring beliefs will automatically lead a person to Truth, or even that Truth is what we necessarily need to work towards all the time. Sometimes, we may value a comforting lie over a harsh truth ? for example, by allowing a fatally wounded person to believe that they will be fine.
But, oddly enough, the fact is that while we may be willing to allow others to believe a lie for their peace of mind, it is rare to find anyone who does not doggedly believe that they must always believe things that are truthful. Indeed, many of us would consider it blameworthy if we pursued anything else ? an apparent set of double standards.
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