Russia and Ukraine: competition or shared destiny?
Many international experts who specialise in the FSU region recognise that the democratic development of Russia and Ukraine are deeply intertwined. Zbigniew Brzezinski, advisor to the Centre for Strategic International Studies, recently illustrated Ukraine's potentially pivotal role in Russia's political evolution. Under his analysis, should Ukraine move towards Europe with a genuine programme of democratic reform, Russia would be likely to follow suit(1).

There can be little doubt that the 2004 Orange Revolution had a significant, lasting impact upon Russia's leadership, middle class and cultural elite; the thousands that turned out in Moscow to protest the recent Presidential elections surely has echoes of Kyiv in 2004. Many Russian's observed the way in which the mobilisation of people power in 2004 affected change in the highest political sphere, making Ukraine a regional example for democratic action. Today, with the rollback of democracy in Ukraine, things may have come full circle with Russia potentially offering Ukraine a model for how to conduct communication between government and citizens; whilst Yanukovych is often accused of following the Russian model to the letter, he is yet to pick up on this particular trend.

In connection with the recent Presidential elections, Russia's authorities are undergoing major internal upheaval; realising that the risk of ignoring a politically active population. Throughout 2011, Prime-Minister Putin repeatedly stated that it was the time to democratise the political system in order to meet the needs of the people and present-day challenges; although these statements were invariably tempered with the caveat that €Russia is a young democracy and cannot expect perfection€. To meet their ends the Russian authorities are planning to introduce a series of communication initiatives, including online social media.

Putin has certainly made some strong verbal commitments to Russia's democratic evolution, which he refers to as, €the careful development of Russia's political system so that it does not fall down to instability". These statements are sometimes even accompanied by more concrete policy suggestions: promote local self-government, develop democracy within each political party and prepare the political system for an evolution into direct democracy. It remains to be seen if the Russian people have the will and collective force to demand these suggestions be transformed into real actions(2).

Either way, the Ukrainian authorities have a fantastic opportunity to improve their international standing by reconnecting with the people. Given the recent souring of Ukraine-EU relations, worsened by the recent guilty verdict delivered to Yuriy Lutsenko the former Minister of Internal Affairs, a step towards democracy should be at the very top of Ukraine's to-do list; Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, has specifically stated that unless the Ukrainian authorities prove their devotion to democratic principles dialogue with EU will be forfeit(3).

Last year's report from Freedom House entitled €Freedom in the World 2011' saw Ukraine downgraded form the status of €free' to €partly free' due to a perceived deterioration of political and civil freedoms; Russia remained firmly in the €not free' category - however, the Russian situation was more let down by its political freedoms, rather than its civil rights(4).

Whether Ukraine's regime will choose the path of democratic reform, and thereby self-preservation, or will continue along the path to Belorussian style isolation now rests upon one question: will Yanukovych continue to model Putin and put forward a democratisation plan, or will he let pride isolate and ultimately subjugate an entire nation.

People First Comment: Vladimir Putin will be the next President of Russia. Despite all the shouting and complaining he would appear to have won the vote almost fairly. As one international commentator put it €Even in Russia you can't fake a 63% vote in his favour'. So what can we expect from a re-invigorated Russian President with a clear mandate?

First of all, Russia has demonstrated that they can hold successful elections even if they were not free; banning the opposition and fielding patsy candidates is stretching the democratic process just a little too far. This may not be free, fair and democratic by western standards but Russia has never followed western convention. President elect Putin was wounded by the strength of the opposition in the run-up to the election. He and President Medvedev had expected flowers to be strewn before them, but instead got rocks and verbal abuse. Mr Putin is a very €Russian' Russian who does not like his authority to be questioned, thus his first steps are likely to be to re-assert his authority.

It is unlikely however that he will weald the big stick at home as this would only enflame an already tense stand-off with the opposition. He will, most likely, take a firm but statesmanlike position as the leader of all Russia. He will clamp down on unruly dissent but he fully understands that if he wants a second term this time around, he is going to have to earn it by delivering on his promises of greater freedom and democracy. The timely removal of the ban on opposition parties would seem to be a first step down this path. In reality, this victory is his golden opportunity to be seen not only as the man who saved Russia from the chaos of the Yeltsin era but also the man who set Russia on the course of democracy and national prosperity. However it is an opportunity that is his to lose.

On the international front he is still a believer in the greater glory of Russia which, sadly, is the dogma of a time gone by. The sabre rattling for which Russia was once famous does not impress anybody anymore as whilst Russia has nuclear weapons the state of the conventional forces is so depleted that their effectiveness cannot be counted upon as the Georgians proved. However, despite the fact that he is a tough negotiator, Putin is respected in the West as he keeps his word, delivers on his promises and, once agreed, he is a reliable partner. Therefore, whilst there may be an initial period in which he may seek to re-establish his international credibility he may well take a more conciliatory line especially if the West is respectful of his elected status and the Russian state. The same cannot be said for his position regarding Ukraine and other states of the former USSR.

The regime in Ukraine has been behaving like an unruly child oscillating between the EU and Russia. They have flip-flopped on virtually all the important issues despite the fact that Russia is a historical partner and the EU one of their largest trading partners. This government is not the first to behave badly in Russian eyes. President Yushchenko took a decidedly westward stance which antagonised Moscow and led to some unnecessary conflicts over gas, grain and food stuffs, however, he had the justification of maintaining an election promise of seeking EU membership. The current government has no justification whatsoever. In view of this and the clear lack of cordiality between Messer's Putin and Yanukovych we can expect fireworks.

By June of 2012 Ukraine is supposed to repay a loan to the Russian VTB bank in the amount of $2 billion and an additional $550 million to GazPromBank. Furthermore, the accrued unpaid penalty payments on years of gas imports are estimated at around $8 billion and growing. Russia and Ukraine have yet to reach an accord on the price Ukraine will have to pay for gas imported from Russia as a result of the 2010 contract signed by imprisoned former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko.

Payment on both of these issues will severely tax the regime at a time when the Ukrainian economy is not in that good a shape and Russia may well not be in the mood to extend the credit and